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ABSTRACT
We present a real-options model of takeovers and disinvestment in declining industries. As product
demand declines, a first-best closure level is reached, where overall value is maximized by shutting
down the .rm and releasing its capital to investors. Absent takeovers, managers of unlevered firms
always abandon the firm’s business too late.  We model the managers’ payout policy absent
takeovers and consider the effects of golden parachutes and leverage on managers’ shut-down
decisions. We analyze the effects of takeovers of under-leveraged firms. Takeovers by raiders
enforce first-best closure. Hostile takeovers by other firms occur either at the first-best closure point
or too early. We also consider management buyouts and mergers of equals and show that in both
cases closure happens inefficiently late.
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There is no single hypothesis which is both plausible and general and which shows promise
of explaining the current merger movement. If so, it is correct to say that there is nothing
known about mergers; there are no useful generalizations. (Segall (1968))
The literature on mergers and acquisitions has grown by orders of magnitude since Joel
Segall wrote in 1968. Most of this research is empirical, testing hypotheses derived from
qualitative economic reasoning. The hypotheses relate to possible motives for mergers and
acquisitions, their impacts on stock-market values, and the eﬀects of ﬁnancial-market con-
ditions and legal constraints. But the hypotheses are not consolidating. One can pick and
choose from the hypotheses to explain almost every merger or acquisition. We do have useful
empirical generalizations, but no theory of the sort that Segall was seeking.
Mergers and acquisitions fall into at least two broad categories. The ﬁrst type exploits
synergies and growth opportunities. The second type seeks greater eﬃciency through layoﬀs,
consolidation and disinvestment. This paper presents a formal theory of the second type.
The theory is a continuous-time, real-options model, in which the managers of the ﬁrm can
abandon its business if product demand falls to a suﬃciently low level. The managers may
abandon voluntarily, or be forced to do so by a takeover. (We will use “takeover” to refer
to all types of mergers and acquisitions.) We analyze the managers’ behavior absent any
takeover threats, then consider what happens if a “raider” or another company can bid to
take over the ﬁrm.
Few takeovers are undertaken solely to force disinvestment. Opportunities for disinvest-
ment and synergy and growth may coexist in the same deal. Takeovers undertaken primarily
for disinvestment are common, however. When U.S. defense budgets fell after the end of the
Cold War, a round of consolidating takeovers followed. The takeovers in the oil industry in
the early 1980s, including Boone Pickens’s raids on Cities Service and Phillips Petroleum
( Ruback (1982, 1983)) also were classic examples. So were the “diet deals” of the LBO
boom of the late 1980s. The banking industry is another good example. The U.S. was
“over-banked” in the 1970s, partly as a result of restrictive state banking regulations. As
regulation eased, a wave of takeovers started. “Super-regionals” have grown by taking over
dozens of relatively small local and regional banks, in each case shedding employees and
consolidating operations.
1Disinvestment is also used as a defense against takeovers. The UK bank NatWest tried
this tactic (unsuccessfully) in response to a hostile takeover bid from the Bank of Scotland:1
NatWest has announced a further 1,650 job cuts as it launches details of its vigorous
defence against the hostile £21bn ($35bn) Bank of Scotland takeover bid. ... Greenwich
NatWest, Ulster Bank, Gartmore and NatWest Equity Partners are to be sold, with surplus
capital returned to shareholders. ... NatWest poured scorn on Bank of Scotland’s claims
regarding cost savings and merger beneﬁts, saying the Edinburgh ﬁrm was “attempting to
hijack cost savings that belong to NatWest shareholders” and claiming unrealistic merger
beneﬁts. (BBC, October 27, 1999)
Why are takeovers necessary to shrink declining industries? The easy answers, such
as “Managers don’t want to lose their jobs,” are not satisfactory. A CEO with a golden
parachute might end up richer by closing redundant plants than by keeping them open. A
CEO who ended up out of work as a result of a successful shutdown ought to be in demand
to run other declining companies.
Of course there are reasons why incumbent managers may not want to disinvest. Their
human capital may be specialized to the ﬁrm or they may be extracting more rents as
incumbents than they could get by starting fresh in another ﬁrm. If these reasons apply, we
are led to further questions. Can a golden parachute or the threat of a takeover overcome the
managers’ reluctance to shrink their ﬁrm? Does the holdup problem described by Grossman
and Hart (1980) prevent eﬃcient takeovers? If another ﬁrm leads a successful takeover, why
do the new managers act to shrink the ﬁrm? Are their incentives any diﬀerent than the old
managers’? Does it make a diﬀerence whether the takeover is launched by another company
or by a raider with purely ﬁnancial motives? We consider these and several related questions
in this paper.
This paper is not just about takeovers, however. In order to analyze takeovers, we ﬁrst
have to identify and examine the reasons for ineﬃcient disinvestment. Thus we have to
derive managers’ payout and closure decisions and consider the possible disciplinary role of
golden parachutes and debt. Our results about payout, golden parachutes and debt policy
are interesting in their own right.
1The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) ended up winning the battle for NatWest. RBS has continued to
pursue diet deals, including $10.5 billion acquisition of Charter One Financial in May 2004.
21.1 Preview of the model and main results
We consider a public ﬁrm with dispersed outside stockholders.2 We assume that managers
maximize the present value of the cash ﬂows they can extract from the ﬁrm. But at the
same time managers have to pay out enough money to prevent investors from exercising their
property rights and taking control of the ﬁrm. The equilibrium payout policy is dynamically
optimal (for the managers). In good times, payout varies with operating cash ﬂow. As
demand falls, a switching point is reached, where payout falls to a ﬁxed, minimum amount
that is proportional to the ﬁrm’s stock of capital.
The ﬁrst-best closure point is the level of demand where shut-down and redeployment of
capital maximizes total ﬁrm value, i.e., the sum of the present values of the managers’ and
investors’ claims on the ﬁrm. (Eﬃciency does not mean ”maximizing shareholder value.”) We
show that managers always wait too long, as product demand declines, before abandoning
and allowing closure. The managers have no property rights to the released capital, and
do not consider its full opportunity cost. But if demand keeps falling, the managers are
eventually forced to pay from their own pockets in order to keep investors at bay. Sooner or
later they give up.3
We consider whether a golden parachute – a contract that shares liquidation proceeds
with the managers – can provide the right incentives for eﬃcient disinvestment. Golden
parachutes can mitigate the late-closure problem but not eliminate it. An “optimal” golden
parachute that would generate ﬁrst best closure always harms outside investors, who would
not approve it.
We also consider how ﬁnancial leverage, and the resulting obligation to pay out cash for
debt service, changes the managers’ behavior. Debt ﬁnancing accelerates abandonment and
improves eﬃciency. There is an optimal debt level, which assures eﬃcient abandonment.
The optimal level is linked to the liquidation value of the ﬁrm’s assets, not to its operating
cash ﬂow or market value.
Our predictions about debt and payout policy are, as far as we know, new theoretical
2Thus our paper is not about optimal ﬁnancial contracting, optimal compensation or managers’ eﬀort.
Also, we do not consider private beneﬁts of control.
3One can easily ﬁnd other reasons for late closure, for example empire building motives, private beneﬁts
or the beneﬁts of risk-taking and delay for ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress – See Decamps and Faure-Grimaud
(2002). Most of our takeover results would follow.
3results. These results can be viewed as formal expressions of the Jensen (1986) free cash ﬂow
theory, which says that managers prefer to capture or invest cash ﬂow rather than paying
it out. Jensen goes on to suggest that high levels of debt (as in LBOs) help solve the free
cash ﬂow problem by forcing payout of cash. But the usual expressions of the free-cash-ﬂow
theory are incomplete. There has to be some minimum payout to investors and therefore
some restriction on managers’ capture or investment of cash ﬂow – otherwise the ﬁrm could
not raise outside ﬁnancing in the ﬁrst place. Our model analyzes this restriction explicitly
in a dynamic setting.
If the ﬁrm carries suﬃcient debt, takeovers have no role to play. Therefore we consider
takeovers of underlevered ﬁrms. The takeovers may be launched by:
1. Raiders, that is, purely ﬁnancial investors. Raiders take over the ﬁrm at exactly the
right level of product demand and shut the ﬁrm down immediately. Thus raiders implement
the ﬁrst-best outcome, where abandonment maximizes the overall value of the ﬁrm, not its
value to the managers or investors separately.
2. Another ﬁrm. Managers of another ﬁrm can launch a hostile takeover. They act just
as a raider would unless they are forced to preempt a competing bid. Preemption means that
the takeover occurs too early, i.e., at too high a demand level. Hostile takeovers require some
commitment mechanism to assure that the acquiring managers actually follow through and
shut down the target. (After the bidding ﬁrm takes over, it also acquires the incentives of
the target management.) The right amount of debt can force disinvestment. Equity-ﬁnanced
takeovers will not occur unless there is some credible alternative commitment mechanism.
3. Management buyouts (MBOs). Allowing managers to buy out their own ﬁrm
prompts them to disinvest at higher levels of demand. Closure still happens ineﬃciently
late, however, because managers lose the ability to capture cash ﬂow when they take over
and shut down. MBOs can occur only if takeovers by raiders or other ﬁrms are ruled out.
4. Mergers of equals. In some cases a ﬁrm that could make a hostile takeover will
be better oﬀ forcing the target to accept a “merger of equals,” in which the merger terms
are negotiated by the two ﬁrms’ managers without putting the target in play. A merger of
equals reduces the power of the target shareholders to extract value from the bidder. Since
a merger of equals does not change managers’ incentives, disinvestment remains ineﬃciently
late. A raider could always contest such a merger and win, however.
At the end of the paper we comment brieﬂy on takeovers for growth or synergy. These
4takeovers are more likely to be eﬀected as mergers of equals, because both ﬁrms’ manage-
ments can share the value added without paying a premium to the shareholders of a target
ﬁrm.
1.2 Literature review
This paper continues a line of research using real-options models to analyze the ﬁnancing
and investment decisions of ﬁrms rather than the valuation of individual investment projects.
Several papers, including Mello and Parsons (1992), Leland (1994), Mauer and Triantis
(1994), Parrino and Weisbach (1999) and Morellec (2001) quantify the possible impacts of
taxes, asset liquidity and stockholder-bondholder conﬂicts on investment decisions and debt
policy. Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) consider
the role of strategic debt service on ﬁrm’s closure decisions and the agency costs of debt.
Lambrecht (2001) examines the eﬀect of product market competition and debt ﬁnancing on
ﬁrm closure in a duopoly.
Many authors, dating back at least to Jensen and Meckling (1976), have proposed that
managers will overinvest (for example in empire-building) and disinvest only if forced to
do so. Recent papers by Leland (1998), Ericsson (2000) and D´ ecamps and Faur´ e-Grimaud
(2002) examine various aspects of this problem. In particular D´ ecamps and Faur´ e-Grimaud
(2002) show that debt ﬁnancing can give equity investors an incentive to delay closure in
order to gamble for resurrection. In our model, the managers decide to delay closure, and
debt ﬁnancing accelerates closure.
Our paper focuses on agency problems between managers and dispersed outside investors.
We follow Myers (2000) by assuming that managers maximize the present value of their
stake in the ﬁrm, subject to constraints imposed by the investors. Papers by Stulz (1990),
Zwiebel (1996) and Morellec (2004) tackle much the same problem, but with interesting
diﬀerences. They assume that the manager derives private, non-pecuniary beneﬁts from
retaining control and reinvesting free cash ﬂow. Debt service reduces free cash ﬂow and
constrains over-investment. In Zwiebel (1996), managers are also constrained by the threats
of takeover and bankruptcy. Bankruptcy plays no role in our model, and we do not invoke
private beneﬁts to support an assumption that managers always want to expand or maintain
investment. Our managers’ beneﬁts are inside our model and are valued endogenously.
Formal models of takeover incentives and decisions are scarce. Lambrecht (2004) presents
5a real-options model of mergers motivated by economies of scale and provides a rationale for
the pro-cyclicality of merger waves. There are no agency costs in his model, and he focuses
on takeovers in rising product markets. We consider takeovers in declining markets. Morellec
and Zhdanov (2005) develop a real-options model that examines the role of multiple bidders
and imperfect information on takeover activity.
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001, 2002) model merger waves that are based on technolog-
ical change and changes in Tobin’s Q. We do not propose to explain merger waves, which
typically occur in buoyant stock markets, but the release of capital in declining industries.
Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen (2000) argue that mergers can be used as a defensive mechanism
by managers who do not wish to be taken over. In their model technological and regulatory
change that makes acquisitions proﬁtable in some future states of the world can induce a
preemptive wave of unproﬁtable, defensive acquisitions. Preemptive mergers can occur in
our theory, but they are oﬀensive and proﬁtable.
A few recent papers model takeover activity as a result of stock market valuations.
Shleifer and Vishny (2001) assume that the stock market may misvalue potential acquirers,
potential targets and their combinations. Managers understand stock market ineﬃciencies
and take advantage of them, in part through takeovers. Takeover gains and merger waves
are driven by market’s valuation mistakes. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003) show
that potential market value deviations from fundamental values can rationally lead to a
correlation between stock merger activity and market valuation.
The empirical implications of our model are mostly in line with the facts about takeovers,
as recently reviewed by Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord (2001). For example, target share-
holders gain. The gain to shareholders on the other side of the transaction is relatively small.
However, we say that the combined increase in the bidding and target ﬁrms’ market values
(or the combined gain to a raider and target) does not measure the economic value added
by the takeover, because the gain to the target shareholders includes their capture of the
value of the target managers’ future cash ﬂows. The target managers’ stake in the ﬁrm is
extinguished by takeover and shutdown. Our model also predicts that the gain to both the
target and acquiring shareholders is zero in the case of friendly mergers. This is consistent
with the evidence.
We also predict that unlevered or underlevered ﬁrms in declining industries are more likely
targets for hostile takeover attempts. We explain why an increase in ﬁnancial leverage (a
leveraged restructuring of the target, for example) can be an eﬀective defense. We also note
6that debt ﬁnancing can pre-commit management to follow through with the restructuring of
the target after the takeover.
The remainder of this paper splits naturally into two main parts. In Section 2, we set out
a formal description of the problem that takeovers can potentially solve. We model managers’
payout policies and closure decisions when takeovers are excluded. We consider the eﬀects
of golden parachutes and ﬁnancial leverage. Section 3 shows how closure decisions change
when takeovers are allowed. We consider takeovers by raiders, hostile takeovers by other
ﬁrms, MBOs and mergers of equals, and we note some empirical and policy implications of
our takeover results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Disinvestment absent takeovers
Consider a ﬁrm that generates a total operating proﬁt of Kx t − f per period, where f is
the ﬁxed cost of operating the ﬁrm. K denotes the amount of capital in place and xt is a
geometric Brownian motion representing exogenous demand shocks:
dxt = µxtdt + σxtdBt, (1)
where µ is a drift term, assumed negative in our numerical examples, and σ measures the
volatility of demand. As demand (xt) falls, the ﬁrm will at some point close down. We
assume that closure is irreversible and that it releases the stock of capital K.F o rn o ww e
assume that the ﬁrm is all-equity ﬁnanced. All capital is returned to shareholders upon
closure.
2.1 First best disinvestment policy
We assume that investors are risk neutral (or that all expected payoﬀs are certainty equiv-
alents). The investors’ expected return from dividends and capital gains must equal the
risk-free rate of return r. Thus the ﬁrst-best ﬁrm value Vt
o satisﬁes the following equilibrium
condition:
rVt
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7We solve this diﬀerential equation subject to the no-bubble condition (for x → +∞)a n dt h e
boundary conditions at the closure point xo. The ﬁrst-best closure policy, the corresponding
ﬁrm value and payout policy are as follows. (Proofs for all propositions are given in the
Appendix.)
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where λ is the negative root of the characteristic equation 1
2σ2p(p−1)+µp = r. The ﬁrst-best
closure rule implies that V o(x) ≥ K for all x ≥ xo. The dividend payout ﬂow until closure
is Kx − f.
This expression for ﬁrm value has a simple economic interpretation: it is the present






can be interpreted as the probability of the ﬁrm closing down in future given
the current demand level x. Note that the optimal closure point (xo) increases with ﬁxed
costs (f) but decreases for higher values of the drift (µ) and volatility (σ) of demand.
2.2 Disinvestment by management
Now we consider the closure policy adopted by managers. The present values of managers’
and equity investors’ claims are R(x)a n dE(x). With no debt, the claims add up to total
ﬁrm value, V (x)=E(x)+R(x). The managers maximize R(x), not V (x), subject to
constraints imposed by outside investors. We assume that the outside investors can take
control, exercising their property rights to the ﬁrm’s assets, and either managing the ﬁrm
privately or closing it down and releasing the stock of capital K. If they manage the ﬁrm,
they implement the ﬁrst-best disinvestment policy and generate the ﬁrst-best ﬁrm value
V o(x). Collective action is costly, however. If outside investors have to mobilize to take
control, they realize only αV o(x)=αmax[V 0(x),K], where 0 <α<1. Thus the threat
8of collective action constrains the managers, but the cost of collective action creates the
space for managerial rents, that is, capture of cash ﬂows by managers. The size of the space
is determined by 1 − α.4
The following assumptions summarize our framework.
Assumption 1 Outside stockholders have put an amount of capital K at the disposal of the
managers of a public corporation. The investors’ property rights to the capital are protected.
Managers can capture operating cash ﬂows, but not the stock of capital.5 The managers’
ability to use and manage this capital can be terminated in two ways:
a) The outside investors take collective action, force out the management and either close
the ﬁrm or manage it privately. Collective action generates a net payoﬀ of αV o(x) for the
investors. The managers get nothing.6
b) The managers close the ﬁrm voluntarily, returning the capital stock to investors. The
managers get nothing.
Assumption 2 Promises made by the management to pay out extra cash or to return the
stock of capital at a particular demand level are not binding and cannot be used to obtain
concessions from investors.
Assumption 3 Managers act as a coalition, maximizing R(x), the present value of the
future cash ﬂows (managerial rents) that they can extract from the ﬁrm. Both managers and
investors are risk-neutral and agree on the value of the ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂows, regardless of
how these cash ﬂows are divided.
4Wrapping up all the costs of corporate governance in one parameter α is a drastic, but very useful
simpliﬁcation. But 1 - α does not have to be taken literally as only measuring the cost of collective action.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) could interpret α as the result of outside investors’ optimal outlays on monitoring
and control. If monitoring and control face decreasing returns, then investors allow managers to capture
some cash ﬂows. The space 1 − α could also represent extra bargaining power created for managers by
entrenching investments. See Shleifer and Vishny (1989).
5It is not necessary to assume that managers can take all operating cash ﬂows but not a penny’s worth
of the stock of capital. The only essential point is that investors’ ability to secure cash ﬂows is weaker, or
more diﬃcult to enforce, than their ability to secure capital assets.
6”Get nothing” does not mean that the managers are penniless. They can still earn their opportunity
wage. We interpret R(x) as the present value of managerial rents above the compensation that managers
could earn outside the ﬁrm.
9Assumption 1(a) establishes the threat of intervention by investors. Intervention does
not occur in equilibrium, because managers pay out enough cash to keep investors at bay.
Assumption 1(b) reﬂects investors’ unqualiﬁed property rights: we assume that they do not
have to take collective action to recover their capital when managers decide to close down
the ﬁrm. In other words, the managers cooperate and do not contest the return of capital.
Assumption 1(b) can be supported in three ways. First, if the act of closure is a veriﬁable and
contractible event, it should be possible to provide for an immediate, automatic liquidating
dividend. (This does not mean that the level of demand is veriﬁable and contractible. If it
were, achieving ﬁrst-best closure would be easy.) Second, Assumption 1(a) means that the
managers cannot just shut down the ﬁrm, sell oﬀ its assets and keep the cash. Therefore
a threat by managers not to return capital is a threat to keep the ﬁrm running at demand
levels below the managers’ optimal closure threshold. Third, the managers’ payoﬀ is zero
if they cooperate and return investors’ capital, and also zero if they force collective action.
Therefore a tiny payment – a small “golden parachute” – should tip the balance in favor of
voluntary return of capital. We return to golden parachutes below, however.
Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 generally follow the “corporation model” in Myers (2000), but
we extend that model in several ways. First, we allow investors to take over the ﬁrm and
manage it as a going concern if the ﬁrm is more valuable alive than dead. Thus the investors’
net payoﬀ is αV o(x)= αmax[V o ,K ], not just αK as in Myers’s paper. Second, we zero in
on the case where the ﬁrm should shut down because of declining demand. Third, we replace
Myers’s discrete-time setup with a continuous time, real options model. This allows us to
model the downward drift and uncertainty of demand and to analyze payout, closure, debt
and several takeover scenarios in a common setting.
The managers set payout policy p(x) to maximize R(x), subject to constraints imposed
by investors’ property rights and ability to take collective action. As the state variable x
falls, the managers have to reach deeper into their own pockets, forgoing managerial rents
in order to service the required payout. They give up at the closure threshold x.A t t h a t
point, managers depart and investors receive the capital value K.
We can now derive the managers’ payout policy, demand threshold for closure, and the
values of investors’ and managers’ claims on the ﬁrm.
Proposition 2 Assume that outside investors face a cost of collective action but, if they
absorb that cost and take control of the ﬁrm, they can run the ﬁrm eﬃciently or shut it
10down. But if the managers shut down the ﬁrm, its capital stock is automatically returned to
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R(x)=V (x) − E(x)











The payout policy p(x) is:
p(x)=α(Kx− f) for x>x o
= rαK for x ≤ x ≤ xo
When there are no costs of collective action (α =1 ), management closes the ﬁrm at the
eﬃcient point (x = xo) and outside shareholders realize the ﬁrst-best ﬁrm value (i.e. E(x)=
V o(x;xo)). When the cost of collective action is strictly positive (α<1), management closes
the ﬁrm ineﬃciently late (i.e. x <x o).
This proposition requires managers to pay out a minimum cash dividend in each period.
If they do this, and investors expect the managers to follow the stated payout policy in future
periods, then the investors do not intervene, and the managers’ stake R(x) is preserved.
The outside equity value consists of two components. The ﬁrst (αV o(x)) is the value





) is the incremental
value from investors’ property rights to the stock of capital K. Property rights ensure that
upon closure outsiders do not get αK (as guaranteed by the threat of collective action) but
the full value K.7
7This result is not strictly necessary for our analysis of takeovers. Suppose that investors do not cooperate
at their shutdown threshold x, so that investors have to bear costs of collective action to recover the capital
stock K. Then equity value at shut-down is not K, but E(x)=αK. The payoﬀs to managers are the same as
in Proposition 2, however, so payout policy is not aﬀected, and shutdown still occurs too late, at x = x. The
outside equity value would be given by E(x)=αV o(x). See the proof of proposition 2 for further details
on this scenario.
11When times are bad, the equity investors’ claim resembles a perpetual debt contract that
pays a ﬁxed coupon ﬂow till default, and upon default pays out the liquidation value of the
ﬁrm. The dividends are like coupon payments and the stock of capital released upon closure
is like the ﬁrm’s liquidation value in bankruptcy.8 By opting for a constant dividend when
demand is low, managers smooth dividends and absorb all underlying variation in earnings.
The closure threshold in Proposition 2 shows why the ﬁrm is closed ineﬃciently late.
Managers do not internalize the full opportunity cost of the capital stock.9 Their payouts
are based on αK,n o tK.T h a ti sw h yαK appears in the numerator of the closure threshold.
The ratio
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to 1, with ﬁrst-best at α = 1. The managers’ closure policy
becomes less eﬃcient as the ratio
f
Kr of ﬁxed operating costs, f, to the opportunity cost of
capital, Kr, declines. The cost of collective action allows managers to ignore part of the
opportunity cost of the capital stock, but they are forced to absorb the ﬁrm’s total operating
costs f if they continue to operate the ﬁrm when x = xo.
The results summarized in Proposition 2 are the foundation of the analysis that follows.
With these results, we can consider the eﬃciency of closure forced by takeovers relative to the
value lost when managers are left alone to close voluntarily. We can see how the value added
by takeovers depends on the costs of collective action, the drift and volatility of demand,
ﬁxed operating costs and the value of the capital stock.
Proposition 2’s explicit valuation of managerial rents is especially important in under-
standing takeovers. These rents are extinguished when a takeover forces closure, but we will
show how the value of these rents ends up in the pockets of the target ﬁrm’s stockholders.
The value gains to investors overstate the value added by the takeovers. The distinction
between rents lost and value added is also a key to understanding the diﬀerences between
8The investors’ claim speciﬁed in Proposition 2 shares some features of convertible debt. Conversion of
debt into equity is irreversible, however. In our model the switch between constant and variable dividend
payments is reversible.
9Thus far we have assumed that disinvestment is an all-or-nothing decision to close down the entire
ﬁrm. Our results generalize to the case of gradual contraction, where disinvestment occurs in two or more
stages. As demand declines, management waits too long to close each stage, although the eﬃcient outcome
is restored when there is no cost of collective action.
12hostile takeovers and ”friendly” mergers – although it turns out that “mergers of equals” are
never friendly in our model.
2.3 Example
Figures 1a, 1b and 1c summarize a numerical example.10 Figure 1a plots ﬁrst-best ﬁrm
value, V o (solid line), ﬁrm value under the managers’ closure policy V (dashed line), equity
value E (dotted line) and the payoﬀ to investors from taking collective action αmax[V o,K]
(double-dashed line). Figure 1b plots R(x), the present value of managerial rents.
First-best closure is at x =0 .0391, the demand level where the ﬁrst-best ﬁrm value
value-matches and smooth-pastes to the value of the capital stock, K = 100. Firm value
increases with demand x. For high levels of demand, the value of the closure option goes to




The managers’ closure threshold is at x =0 .0293, the demand level where the managers’
value R(x) value-matches and smooth-pastes to the zero value line (see Figure 1b). Since
management closes the ﬁrm ineﬃciently late, total ﬁrm value is below ﬁrst-best. Value is
therefore destroyed at the expense of investors. Late closure also makes equity value and
total ﬁrm value U-shaped functions of the state variable x.T h e s e v a l u e s increase in the
run-down to closure – the possibility of receiving the capital stock in the near future is
positive news for investors.11 Equity value equals K at x (closure), reaches a minimum
(which exceeds αK) as demand increases, and thereafter increases and gradually converges








Investors’ payoﬀ from taking collective action (shown as a double-dotted line) is αK
when the state variable is below the ﬁrst-best closure point and αV o(x) otherwise. Note
that the outside equity value exceeds αV o(x) at all times. This follows from the fact that
10The parameters used to generate the ﬁgure are: µ = −0.02, r =0 .05, σ =0 .2, α =0 .7, K = 100 and
f =1 .
11Proposition 2 implies that equity value E(x) is greater than αK when demand falls close to the managers’
closure threshold x. In other words, equity value exceeds what investors could get from collective action.
The extra value reﬂects investors’ property rights to the full asset value K if the managers shut down the
ﬁrm. We have investigated other possible equilibria that would allow managers to extract part of this extra
value by cutting payout below p(x)=rαK at low levels of demand. These alternatives have the same
qualitative implications for disinvestment and takeovers, but they are fragile and do not have closed-form
solutions. For simplicity we build on the equilibrium given in Proposition 2.
13property rights force E = K at closure.
Figure 1c plots cash payout p(x) (solid line) and the managers’ cash ﬂow (dashed line).12
When demand exceeds the ﬁrst-best closure point, payout is a fraction α of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts
(α(Kx − f)). For levels of x below the ﬁrst-best closure point, collective action would shut
down the ﬁrm, with investors receiving a ﬁxed payoﬀ αK (0.7 ∗ 100 = 70). To discourage
investors from closing the ﬁrm in bad times, management must pay a constant dividend ﬂow
of rαK (0.05 × 0.7 × 100 = 3.5) until the ﬁrm is closed at x =0 .0293. There is therefore a
switch in payout policy at the ﬁrst-best closure point.13
2.4 Golden parachutes and eﬃcient closure
Now we investigate whether a “golden parachute” contract could lead the managers to shut
down the ﬁrm at the ﬁrst-best closure threshold xo. A golden parachute (1 − θ)K would
pay the managers some fraction 1 − θ of the proceeds if and when they shut down the ﬁrm
and liquidate its capital stock. It turns out that a golden parachute could speed up closure,
but that investors will not accept a golden parachute generous enough to assure ﬁrst-best
closure.
The ﬁrst-best golden parachute would set θ = α, so that the managers capture the same
fraction of liquidation value and operating cash ﬂows. Then the managers’ and investors’
interests would be aligned. Closure would happen at the eﬃcient point xo. Payout policy,
the values of the investors’ and managers’ claims would be:
p(x)= α(Kx − f) for x>x o
E(x)=αV 0(x)
R(x)=( 1 − α)V 0(x)
Since the constraint E(x) ≥ αV o(x) is binding everywhere and the total ﬁrm value is ﬁrst-
best, the managers cannot extract more value, and this ﬁrst-best solution is also optimal
12Note how the managers’ cash ﬂow turns negative as demand declines and approaches the shutdown
point. In this region, the managers contribute money from their own pockets or “sweat equity”, and keep
the ﬁrm going in the hope of recovery. Such “propping” is common, though not universal, in our model.
Propping also occurs in Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003).
13This switch can sometimes increase payout, depending on the model parameters. For example, high
demand volatility pushes optimal closure to low demand levels where α(Kx − f) is relatively small, and
possibly smaller than the post-switch payout rαK .
14from their point of view.
But this solution is not as easy as it looks. First, is closure at the ﬁrst-best demand
level xo a veriﬁable and contractible event? The answer may depend on the nature of the
asset and the closure decision. If the only asset is a speciﬁc, tangible asset – a factory,
say – and closure means shutting down the factory and selling it, then a golden parachute
should work. But if some assets are intangible, and closure is gradual and requires a series
of decisions, then contracting becomes more diﬃcult. Presumably the golden parachute has
to be set up ahead of time, when the ﬁrm is still a healthy going concern. At that point it
may be impossible to write a complete contract specifying the actions required for eﬃcient
closure. Absent a complete contract, managers will be tempted to look for ways to take their
golden parachute and keep the ﬁrm operating anyway. (This temptation does not arise at
the ineﬃcient threshold x, where closure optimizes the managers’ value.) These problems
may explain why actual golden parachutes pay oﬀ only when there is a takeover or other
change in control, not when the ﬁrm disinvests.
But assume that closure is contractible. Will investors award a golden parachute equal
to (1−α)K? No, because the value of investors’ claim in the ﬁrst-best case where θ = α is
only E(x)=αV 0(x), less than the value when managers close ineﬃciently late. (Compare
the ﬁrst-best E(x)=αV 0(x)t ot h ev a l u eo fE(x) in proposition 2).14
Assume that managers get (1−θ)K on closure. Using a similar derivation as for propo-
sition 2, the values of the investors’ and managers’ claims are:






= θK for x ≤ x
R(x)=V (x) − E(x)
The best golden parachute for investors maximizes equity value E(x;θ) with respect to θ.
This gives the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume that investors face a cost of collective action, but if they absorb that
cost and take control of the ﬁrm, they can run the ﬁrm eﬃciently or shut it down. Investors
have property rights to the stock of capital K, but award a golden parachute equal to (1−θ)K
14The ﬁrst-best golden parachute, with θ = α, is in the joint interest of investors and managers, and
could be negotiated if the managers could make a side payment to investors. We assume that the managers’
wealth is limited, however. In particular, managers cannot raise money today by pledging not to capture
operating cash ﬂow in the future. See Assumption 2.
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= θK for x ≤ x
R(x)=V (x) − E(x)











The payout policy p(x) is:
p(x)=α(Kx− f) for x>x o
= rαK for x ≤ x ≤ xo
The optimal value for θ,which strikes a balance between the beneﬁt of earlier closure and the
cost of awarding the golden parachute, is:
θ
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K <x o if θ∗ =1
Even with an optimal golden parachute, managers’ closure decisions remain ineﬃciently late.
Since θ∗ strictly exceeds α, the optimal golden parachute is always less than (1 − α)K,
and managerial closure remains ineﬃciently late (i.e. x <x o). Investors will never oﬀer
managers the full amount of the cost of collective action. They may not oﬀer anything: a








Since λ<0, golden parachutes should be more likely for ﬁrms with a high cost of collective
action (low α), low ﬁxed costs (low f) and a high stock of capital (K). Since ∂λ
∂σ > 0,
16∂λ
∂µ < 0and ∂λ
∂r < 0, golden parachutes are less likely for ﬁrms with high demand volatility
(σ) and negative growth (µ<0), and when the interest rate (r)i sl o w .
The intuition for these results is simple. First take the extreme case where α =0a n d
f = 0. Then management would never close the ﬁrm without a golden parachute. Investors’
would never receive any payout and their equity would be worthless. However, by awarding a
golden parachute (and sharing the proceeds from closure), investors could induce managers
to close the ﬁrm at some low level of demand, giving outside equity some value. On the
other hand, if the cost of collective action is zero (α = 1), then managerial closure policy is
eﬃcient anyway, and golden parachutes are redundant.
Second, high ﬁxed costs and declining demand discipline managers and reduce the need
for a golden parachute. Third, if the stock of capital K and the interest rate r are high,
then the opportunity cost of the capital stock is also high, which makes accelerated closure
through a golden parachute more desirable. Finally, if volatility is low, say σ =0,t h e n
λ →− ∞and hence the ﬁrst-best closure point is xo = (K +
f
r)
K , and the option value of
delaying abandonment beyond this breakeven point is zero. Yet managers will carry on until
x = (αK +
f
r)
K . This delay is particularly costly if the decline in demand is slow. A golden
parachute may therefore be desirable to speed up closure for relatively safe ﬁrms.
The key point for the rest of this paper is that golden parachute contracts cannot rea-
sonably be expected to solve the problem of late disinvestment by self-interested managers.
Perhaps debt will work.
2.5 Debt ﬁnancing
Now we brieﬂy analyze how debt ﬁnancing inﬂuences ﬁrm value and the managers’ actions.
In the interest of space we do not go into details. A complete analysis of debt policy is
beyond the scope of this paper and is developed in Lambrecht and Myers (2004). Our point
here is just to show how debt ﬁnancing can force eﬃcient closure in the model we have set
out.
Assume that a perpetual debt contract is issued with principal D. The debt is fully
collateralized by the ﬁrm’s assets (D ≤ K). Assume also that the cost of collective action
is independent of the level of debt D and is therefore, as in the unlevered case, given by
17(1 − α)V o(x;xo).15
If we rule out equity issues to pay for debt service,16 managers’ cash ﬂows when x ≤ xo,
after dividends and interest repayments, are:
(Kx − f) − max[0,r α K− rD] − rD
= Kx − f − rαK if D<α K
= Kx − f − rD if D>α K
If D<α K ,managers can pay debt interest by cutting payout to equity investors. But
if D>α K , part of the debt service comes out of managers’ pockets. (Payout cannot
be negative when equity issues are ruled out.) Increasing debt above αK therefore forces
managers to close the ﬁrm earlier, because debt service reduces managerial rents. The
demand threshold for closure increases monotonically with the debt level D, and there is an
optimal debt level D∗ that enforces closure at the ﬁrst-best closure point xo. Debt higher than
D∗ forces ineﬃciently early closure. Lambrecht and Myers (2004) show that the optimal debt
level D∗ is independent of the level of the state variable and therefore dynamically optimal.
Furthermore, the optimal capital structure is linked to the liquidation value K, not to the
ﬁrm’s market value as a going concern. We therefore predict optimal book leverage D∗
K and
not optimal market leverage.
It seems clear that debt can play an important role in bonding managers to a particular
closure policy. For example, debt can commit the acquiring management to follow through
after a takeover and close the target ﬁrm. Also, low-debt ﬁrms are more likely to be takeover
targets – there is no need for takeovers to force eﬃcient disinvestment if debt is set and held
at the right level. We should not see takeovers where the only immediate result is more debt
but no immediate disinvestment.
15In other words, the net payoﬀto investors when they take over the levered ﬁrm is αmax[V o ,K ] − D,
not αmax[V o − D,K− D]. Lambrecht and Myers (2004) explore both speciﬁcations.
16This important assumption is implicit in most prior research that invokes debt service as a device to
discipline managers and retard over-investment. See, for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Stulz (1990)
and Zwiebel (1996). Clearly there is no discipline if managers can just issue shares to service debt. In fact,
Lambrecht and Myers (2004) show that debt is irrelevant, at least in the model presented here, if equity
issues are allowed. If they are allowed, and debt service exceeds equilibrium payout under all-equity ﬁnancing,
managers can issue equity to make up the diﬀerence, thus passing the burden of debt on to investors. Debt
would not aﬀect managers’ cash ﬂows or closure policy.
183 Disinvestment forced by takeovers
Now we consider whether takeovers can force eﬃcient disinvestment. We adopt the following
assumptions:
Assumption 4 The supply of bidders is limited by entry and setup costs. Once these costs
are sunk, the bidder’s cost of collective action is zero (α =1 ).
Assumption 5 Since the supply of bidders is limited, outside investors perceive the proba-
bility of attack to be negligibly small and are therefore always acquired by surprise.
Assumption 5 implies that stock valuations prior to the takeover do not incorporate the
potential beneﬁt associated with takeovers and that the target’s stock price jumps up when
the takeover is announced.17 Shleifer and Vishny (2001) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2005)
make a similar assumption, whereas Lambrecht (2004) incorporates potential merger beneﬁts
into the valuation.
Next, we specify how the payoﬀs to a takeover are shared between the target shareholders,
the target managers and the bidder. The payoﬀ from closing down the target is K.T h e
value created by the takeover is therefore K − V (x;x). When the target is shut down, the
target managers get nothing, because they have no property rights to the stock of capital.
The value of the target ﬁrm is split between the target shareholders and the bidder. When
the target is in play, its shareholders can hold out (note the Grossman and Hart (1980)
free-rider problem) and push their equity value at least to V (x,x), the full ﬁrm value prior
to the takeover. In addition they get a fraction (1 − γ) of the value added K − V (x,x).
Assumption 6 Target shareholders receive V (x;x), the target’s overall value prior to the
takeover, plus a fraction (1 − γ) of K − V (x,x), the value that can be created by the takeover
and shutdown.
17Assumption 5 simpliﬁes exposition but is not strictly necessary for our results. Suppose that managers
are forewarned that a raider is lurking. The only actions that the target ﬁrm’s managers could take are (1)
increase debt to D* or (2) reduce capture of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows. We rule out (1) by focusing on unlevered or
underlevered ﬁrms. Action (2) is unlikely, because managers have no incentive to reduce capture at demand
levels above the point where a takeover occurs, and at that point the ﬁrm is shut down anyway. Action (2)
would not work anyway, given Assumption 2. Forewarning of a takeover attempt would give the target ﬁrm
time to shore up its takeover defenses, however.
19Assumption 7 Managers can only acquire the target if the payoﬀ from closing down the
target is positive.
Assumption 7 rules out pre-emptive takeovers motivated purely by self-defense. We require
that the payoﬀ from closure is positive (i.e. K − V (x) ≥ 0) and that only takeovers that
are inherently value-increasing (or value-neutral) are possible. Assumption 7 is important,
and we believe it is reasonable. Suppose that B’s management is threatened with takeover
by ﬁrm A at demand level x. Takeover means that B’s managers lose rents worth RB(x). If
B can preempt and acquire A, the net payoﬀ to B’s managers is RB(x)+γ (K − VA(x)).
Suppose K − VA(x) is negative, contrary to assumption 7. Then B’s managers must ﬁnance
the takeover partly out of their own pockets.18 Unless they are independently wealthy, they
would have to try to sell oﬀ or borrow against RB(x). But managers cannot commit not
to capture future rents, a fortiori if rents are the product of “inalienable” human capital
and eﬀort (see Hart and Moore (1994)). Therefore B’s managers could not ﬁnance a value-
destroying takeover.19
We now consider takeovers by raiders, takeovers by other ﬁrms, management buyouts
and mergers of equals. We deﬁne a raider as a ﬁnancial investor that specializes in takeovers
and restructuring. A raider acts on its own behalf, not on behalf of outside investors. Since
the target shareholders receive V +( 1−γ)(K − V (x;x)), the raider’s payoﬀ from acquiring
and closing the ﬁrm is: γ (K − V (x;x)).
In a hostile takeover,ﬁ r mA acquires another ﬁrm B. The acquisition is decided on and
executed by the managers of the acquiring ﬁrm A. A’s managers maximize their personal
gain from the deal, subject to the threat of collective action by A’s shareholders. This
means that, as long as the deal makes A’s outside investors no worse oﬀ, A’s management
can extract all remaining takeover surplus. (We could give some fraction of the takeover
gain to the acquirer’s investors. As we show later, this would not alter our results.)
In a one-way hostile takeover, A can acquire B, but not the other way around. The payoﬀs
18The managers have already reduced payout to the limit allowed by the threat of collective action.
Therefore they have no ”slack” to extract from their own shareholders.
19In our model, managers do sometimes pay out of their own pockets to help cover required debt service
and payouts to investors. For example, managers may be better oﬀkeeping the ﬁrm going even when
operating cash ﬂows are negative (Kx− f<0). But these payments are a ﬂow that can be stopped at any
time by closing the ﬁrm, not a lump-sum contribution amounting to a signiﬁcant fraction of the value of the
ﬁrm. Managers may also be able to cover operating losses by putting in “sweat equity,” but this does not
help to ﬁnance a takeover.
20Table 1: A comparative description of the takeover cases
Acquirer’s payoﬀ: Subject to: Target is:
Raider γ (KB − VB(x;xB)) In play
Hostile takeover, one-way γ (KB − VB(x;xB)) Commitment device In play
Hostile takeover, two-way γ (KB − VB(x;xB)) Commitment device, In play
preemptive threat
MBO γ (KB − VB(x;xB)) − RB(x) In play
Merger RB(x) Not in play
to A’s and B’s managers from acquisition and closure of ﬁrm B are γB (KB − VB(x;xB)) and
zero. The payoﬀs to A’s and B’s shareholders are zero and VB +( 1−γB)(KB − VB(x;xB)).
The objective of A’s managers is the same as the raider’s ex ante, but not necessarily ex-post.
After the takeover has been paid for and is a done deal, A’s managers may be better oﬀ if they
do not close the target, but instead take the place of B’s managers and continue to capture
part of the cashﬂows generated by B’s assets. This is the case if γB (KB − VB(x)) <R B(x).
Therefore, to get the deal approved by its shareholders A’s managers may need a device that
credibly forces them to commit to restructuring. We return to this point later.
In a two-way hostile takeover, A can acquire B or vice versa. Incentives and payoﬀs
are similar to a one-way takeover, except that one ﬁrm may act preemptively to acquire
its opponent in order to safeguard its own managers’ rents. We will show that this sort of
competition can lead to early takeover and ineﬃcient closure.
A management buyout (MBO) is a takeover of the ﬁrm by its own managers. The
managers act like a raider, except that they give up future rents after a buyout, while a
raider has nothing to lose.
Finally, in a merger of equals, two ﬁrms’ managers act cooperatively and strike an agree-
ment without putting either ﬁrm in play. No bid premium is paid to shareholders. Both
ﬁrms’ managers act in their own interest, constrained as usual by the threat of collective
action by investors.
Thus we have four takeover and restructuring mechanisms (raiders, hostile takeovers,
MBOs and mergers of equals) that diﬀer across three key dimensions: (1) Whether the
21target is in play and a premium needs to be paid to the target’s shareholders; (2) whether
a mechanism is needed to commit acquiring managers to follow through and shut down the
target, and (3) whether the target can threaten to preempt and acquire the bidder. Table 1
sets out the various cases.
We now analyze each takeover mechanism.
3.1 Raiders
When the raider takes over and closes the target, the payoﬀ is γ (K − V (x,x)), where γ
was deﬁned in assumption 6. This payoﬀ is the raider’s compensation for acquiring and
restructuring the ﬁrm. The raider has a zero cost of collective action (α = 1) and therefore
realizes the full stock of capital K,n o tαK.S i n c eV (x;x) is a convex function in x it follows
that the raider’s payoﬀ is a concave function. It is zero at x = x, thereafter increases with
x, reaches a maximum and subsequently monotonically decreases and becomes negative.
A positive NPV (i.e. K−V (x) ≥ 0) is a necessary condition for takeover by a raider. But
positive NPV is not suﬃcient, because demand uncertainty and irreversible disinvestment
create an option to wait. Using standard real option techniques, we show in the Appendix
that the raider’s optimal takeover policy is a trigger strategy: the raider acquires the target
as soon as the state variable drops below some threshold xr. The raider’s optimal threshold
is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If the initial level of demand is above the ﬁrst-best closure threshold xo,t h e n
the raider waits, and takes over and closes down the ﬁrm as soon as demand falls below the
ﬁrst-best closure point xo.
Proposition 4 says that in a declining market the raider acquires and restructures the ﬁrm
at the eﬃcient time. The ﬁrst-best closure policy maximizes the present value of the raider’s
takeover surplus γ (K − V (x,x)). The eﬃcient outcome is achieved because the raider’s
objective function (unlike the target management’s) takes into account the full stock of
capital K.
Why does the raider, who is only interested in the ﬁnancial payoﬀ, end up maximizing
the sum of the value to investors and the value to managers? The reason is that R(x,xo)=0
22at the optimal shutdown point x = xo,s oV o = Eo = K. But note that the raider does
have to “buy out” R(x,x), the value of the rents that the target managers would have
received absent the takeover. Unfortunately for the managers, the buyout proceeds do not
go to the managers but to the target shareholders, who can hold up the bidder for at
least the full value of the target ﬁrm under existing management. That is, the bidder pays
V (x,x)=R(x,x)+E(x,x) plus the fraction 1 − γ of the value added.
The target managers may regard the loss of R(x,x) as a “breach of trust” of the sort
described by Shleifer and Summers (1988). The breach is eﬃcient, however. If the breach
is regarded as unfair, then the unfairness can be traced back to the diﬃculty of writing and
enforcing the value-maximizing employment contract, which would require managers to close
down at the optimal demand level xo.
Shleifer and Summers (1988) say that a raider could take over a ﬁrm not in order to shrink
its assets, but simply to capture the rents going to incumbent managers. This cannot happen
in our model, because the rents are shifted to target shareholders and not captured by the
raider. (The Grossman-Hart (1980) holdup problem prevents hostile takeovers motivated
solely by rent-seeking.) But we agree with Shleifer and Summers that a large part of the
stock-market gains to merger announcements represent transfers from other stakeholders.
Our comments about breach of trust also apply to takeovers by other ﬁrms, which we turn
to now.
3.2 Hostile Takeovers
3.2.1 One-way Hostile Takeovers
Assume that ﬁrm A can acquire ﬁrm B, but not the other way around. We ignore possible
synergies from combining the ﬁrms’ operations, and assume that the only opportunity to
add value is by forcing the target ﬁrm to shut down. The price that A must pay to B’s
shareholders is VB(x;xB)+( 1−γ)(K − VB(x,xB)). A’s managers receive the fraction γ of
the value created. If ﬁrm A acts like a raider and acquires and closes down the ﬁrm at the
ﬁrst-best closure point, then its shareholders are not harmed:
Proceeds to acquiring shareholders
= Acquisitionproceeds − paymenttotargetshareholders − paymenttoacquiringmanagers
= K − [VB(xB
o,x B)+( 1− γ)(K − VB(xB
o,x B))] − γ (K − VB(xB
o,x B)) = 0(11)
23In other words, the takeover is zero-NPV for the acquiring shareholders, because all value
created is shared between the target shareholders and the acquiring management. The
payoﬀ γ (K − VB(x;xB)) to A’s managers is exactly the same as to a raider. Therefore the
takeover occurs at the same ﬁrst-best demand level. Notice that ﬁrm A’s stockholders are
not harmed by the takeover and shutdown of ﬁrm B, and have no reason to intervene to
prevent it. However, their wealth gain from the takeover is zero. This outcome seems to
be roughly true empirically; see Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord (2001). The lion’s share
of merger gains seems to go to the target ﬁrm’s shareholders – and in our model, to the
acquiring ﬁrm’s management.
If we take assumption 1(b) strictly and literally, perhaps A’s shareholders should get the
lion’s share of proﬁts. Takeover and shutdown of ﬁrm B releases its capital stock K.I fs h a r e -
holders have complete, automatic property rights to released capital, then A’s shareholders
should get a ”free gift” of K from shutdown of B. This would leave A’s managers with no
gain and no incentive to go ahead with the takeover. This is not a cul de sac, however, be-
cause we can easily extend our model to assume that A’s stockholders and managers could
split the merger gains.20 Our main results do not change.
There is another important diﬀerence between the raider and hostile takeover cases. The
raider always closes the target immediately after takeover. The management of an acquiring
company may not follow through. Once the takeover is a done deal, A’s managers may be
better oﬀ if they take the place of B’s managers and continue to capture some of the cash
ﬂows generated by B’s assets. This is the case if γ (KB − VB(x;xB)) <R B(x). How then
can hostile takeovers lead to eﬃcient disinvestment?
The ﬁrst, partial answer is that A’s stockholders will prevent a takeover unless A’s man-
agement makes a credible commitment to shut down B. Suppose that A acquires B at a
demand level x ≥ xo, and suppose that investors anticipate that B will be shut down too
late, at a demand level xB <x o. The payoﬀ to the acquiring shareholders is:
Proceeds to acquiring shareholders
= acquisition proceeds − payment to target shareholders − payment to acquiring managers
= VB(x,xB) − [VB(x,xB)+( 1− γ)(K − VB(x,xB))] − [RB(x,xB)]
= EB(x,xB) − [VB(x,xB)+( 1− γ)(K − VB(x,xB))] < 0
20From our model in Section 2, one could argue that a fraction α of the acquiring ﬁrm’s gain goes to
its investors. Then the payoﬀto A’s managers would be scaled down by a factor of (1 − α)t o( 1−
α)γ (K − VB(x;xB)). The takeover threshold would not change, however.
24In other words, the acquiring shareholders would receive the target’s existing equity value,
EB(x,xB), but pay the total ﬁrm value VB(x,xB)p l u s( 1−γ)(K − VB(x,xB)). This would
reduce their equity value and trigger collective action against A’s managers. Therefore the
takeover could not take place.
The second answer is that debt ﬁnancing can provide a bonding mechanism to force
shutdown. Managers could ﬁnance the takeover by the amount of debt that pre-commits
them to shut down the ﬁrm immediately after the takeover. We know from Section 2 that
such a debt level always exists, because the closure threshold is monotonically increasing in
the level of debt when equity issues are restricted. This may be one explanation for leveraged
buyouts, for example.
Our results can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If ﬁrm A can acquire ﬁrm B, but not vice versa, then the timing of the
takeover is the same as in the raider case; acquisition happens at the ﬁrst-best closure point.
But the takeover may have to be ﬁnanced by the debt level that forces the target to be closed
immediately after the takeover.
3.2.2 Two-way Takeovers
Consider next the case where A can acquire B or B can acquire A. The normal form of the
g a m ei sg i v e nb y :
Payoﬀ to A s managers Payoﬀ to B s managers
A acquires B γB (KB − VB(x;xB)) −RB(x;xB)
B acquires A −RA(x;xA) γA (KA − VA(x;xA))
Assumption 7 rules out value-reducing takeovers, so each ﬁrm can act only if takeover is
positive-NPV project, i.e. Ki − Vi(x;xi) ≥ 0,i= A,B. Each ﬁrm has a breakeven point,
xi
∗ such that Vi(xi
∗,x i)=Ki (with xi <x i
∗)a n d
Ki − Vi(x,xi) ≥ 0for all x ∈ [xi,x i
∗]( i = A,B) (12)
When demand falls in the interval [xi,x i
∗], acquiring ﬁrm i and closing it down is positive
NPV. Assume, without loss of generality, that xB
∗ >x A
∗ and that the initial level of
25demand exceeds xB
∗. Which ﬁrm will then be the acquirer, and at what demand level does
the takeover happen? The answer to the ﬁrst question is that the ﬁrm with the lowest
breakeven threshold, xi
∗ (in our case, ﬁrm A) will be the acquirer. As demand declines,
acquiring ﬁrm B becomes a positive-NPV action for ﬁrm A at xB
∗ before B can acquire
A at xA
∗. The ﬁrm with the lowest breakeven threshold can therefore always preempt its
opponent, if necessary.
At what level of demand will ﬁrm A acquire ﬁrm B? Ideally, A would acquire B at
B’s ﬁrst-best disinvestment threshold, xB
o, as in Proposition 5. However, the threat of a
preemptive takeover by B could speed up a takeover by A. If A’s breakeven point exceeds B’s
optimal disinvestment threshold (xA
∗ >x B
o)t h e nB has an incentive to “epsilon preempt”
ﬁrm A at xB
o +  . This in turn would encourage A to preempt B at xB
o +2  ,a n ds o
on. Therefore, if xA
∗ >x B
o, in equilibrium ﬁrm A acquires B when x equals xA
∗,w h i c hi s
the point where preemption by B is no longer proﬁtable or feasible (see assumption 7). If,
however, xA
∗ <x B
o, then there is no danger that B may preempt A,a n dA acquires B at
xB
o. These results can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 If xi
∗ is deﬁned as the breakeven point at which ﬁrm i’s value equals its
capital stock (Vi(xi
∗,x i)=Ki, i = A,B), then the acquirer is the ﬁrm with the lower
breakeven point, and the target is the ﬁrm with the higher breakeven point. The ﬁrm whose
asset value drops ﬁrst below the value of its stock of capital is taken over by its opponent and










∗ (with B being the acquirer) (13)
Therefore corporate restructurings induced by hostile takeovers either happen at the eﬃcient
time or ineﬃciently early.
Note that, as in the one-way takeover, the acquiring ﬁrm’s managers must supply a
credible commitment to follow through and shut down the acquired ﬁrm. Debt can again
act as a bonding device and enforce immediate closure.21
21If the takeover happens at a demand level that exceeds the ﬁrst-best closure point then ideally closure
should be delayed. In principle managers could adopt a debt level that forces them to close the target when
demand falls to the ﬁrst-best closure point. In practice this may not be as simple as it appears since there
is no guarantee that managers will maintain the right debt level. In particular managers may over time
26All else equal, the ﬁrm with the highest cost of collective action (i.e., the lowest α)i s
the takeover target, and the ﬁrm with the lowest cost of collective action (highest α)i st h e
acquirer. The reason is that a higher cost of collective action causes the ﬁrm to be closed
more ineﬃciently late by its managers, which decreases the ﬁrm’s value V (x,x) from its
ﬁrst-best value, V o(x,x).
3.3 Management Buyouts
Instead of collecting as many rents as possible and closing down the ﬁrm ineﬃciently late
(at x), managers could organize a management buyout (MBO). They will do so at a given
demand level x if and only if the net proceeds from a buyout exceed the present value of all
remaining rents:
γ (K − V (x;x)) >R (x;x) (14)
We know from the raider and takeover cases that there is a breakeven threshold, x∗,s u c h
that γ (K − V (x;x)) ≥ 0for all x ∈ [x,x ∗](x>x ∗). The diﬀerence between takeover by a
raider (or another ﬁrm) and a MBO is that the managers in a MBO forgo future rents after
a buyout, while a raider has nothing to lose. It follows that managers in an MBO have an
incentive to acquire the ﬁrm at a later point than a raider would. There is a MBO breakeven
threshold x∗∗ (with x∗∗ <x ∗) such that:22
γ (K − V (x;x)) − R(x;x) ≥ 0for x ∈ [x,x
∗∗] (15)
Buying out the ﬁrm and closing it down pays oﬀ for managers only if demand falls suﬃciently
close to the shut down point x. However, the managers will not usually exercise their MBO
shutdown option immediately when x falls to x∗∗. They still have the option to delay,
and their optimal exercise point depends on the drift and uncertainty in demand. In the
Appendix we derive the optimal trigger xmb at which the MBO takes place:
Proposition 7 If the initial level of demand is above xmb then managers prefer to carry on
collecting rents until demand falls to xmb. The threshold xmb at which the managers buy out
the ﬁrm and close it down is, however, ineﬃciently late (x <x mb <x o).
cross-subsidize the target with cash from the acquiring ﬁrm. Since these issues are beyond the scope of this
paper we assume that investors require managers to adopt a debt level that enforces immediate closure after
the takeover.
22This result follows from the fact that R(x;x) = 0, and R (x;x) > 0 for all x>x .
27An MBO allows management to capture part of the value created by shutting down the
ﬁrm and releasing its stock of capital. But managers close the ﬁrm later than an outside
acquirer, because the managers give up their ability to capture cash ﬂows from the going
concern. An outside acquirer does not sacriﬁce any such rents.
MBOs undertaken to shrink or shut down the ﬁrm should not occur if takeovers by raiders
or other ﬁrms are allowed. The raiders or other ﬁrms would act ﬁrst as demand declines.
However, MBOs often involve partial buyouts, which may be diﬃcult to achieve through
takeovers. For example, a raider might have to take over the whole ﬁrm to shut down one
piece of it.
3.4 Mergers
Suppose A and B join in a “merger of equals.” We assume that the merger does not create
any synergies. In a merger of equals, the target ﬁrm B is not in play, and the target
shareholders do not receive a bid premium. Since RA and RB a r ea l r e a d yt h em a x i m u m
rents that insiders can extract from each ﬁrm, RA(x)+RB(x) is the most that the managers
of A and B can achieve jointly. By merging, the managers simply combine and redistribute
the existing rents. Managers do not have an incentive to close down either ﬁrm, because
closure would require payout of the stock of capital.
The managers of ﬁrm A will consider a merger, instead of a hostile takeover, only if the
present value of the joint rents is larger than the payoﬀ from a takeover:
RA(x)+RB(x) >R A(x)+γ (K − VB(x;xB)) (16)
RB(x) >γ (K − VB(x;xB)) (17)
In other words, the rent value RB(x), which would captured by target shareholders in a
takeover, but is retained by managers in a merger, has to exceed the acquiring ﬁrm’s gain
in a hostile takeover.
The decision whether to merge or acquire is similar to the managers’ decision whether
to keep collecting rents or to buy out the ﬁrm in a MBO. It follows from the analysis of
the MBO case that there exists a threshold x∗∗ such that for all x below (above) x∗∗ ﬁrm A
prefers to acquire (merge with) ﬁrm B.
If A can undertake a hostile takeover, then ﬁrm B’s rents have to be redistributed in a
28merger. A’s managers will demand at least γ (K − VB(x;xB)). Only the remaining value
(RB(x) − γ (K − VB(x;xB))) could be shared with the target management. Therefore the
target management always loses out in a merger, and resists a merger as long as possible.
The managers of the target ﬁrm B refuse to merge until A’s threat to acquire B is credible.
We know from proposition 6 that A would acquire B at max[xB
o,x A
∗]( p r i o rt ot h i sp o i n t
A’s threat to acquire B is not credible), and only at this point will B accept the merger.
Whether A prefers a merger to a takeover at this point is determined by the inequality (17).
If A decides to merge, it can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the management of B,i n
which B gets a small consolation prize. (Note that A has all the bargaining power.) We
summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 8 There is a breakeven demand threshold x∗∗, such that for all levels of demand
below (above) x∗∗ the acquiring management prefers a hostile takeover (merger), where x∗∗
is the solution to the equation RB(x∗∗)=γ (K − VB(x∗∗;xB)). The takeover or merger
happens at the point where A would acquire B (as given in Proposition 6). A takeover
(merger) occurs if the restructuring takes place at a state variable level below (above) x∗∗.
In a hostile takeover, the target is closed down immediately. In a non-synergistic merger the
managers’ closure policies are maintained, and ﬁrm B therefore closed ineﬃciently late.
3.5 A comparison of takeover mechanisms
We are now in a position to compare takeover mechanisms and to draw implications. We start
by comparing the takeover timing and closure policies across the four takeover mechanisms
studied. The takeover thresholds for a raider, hostile takeover, management buyout and
merger are xr, xht, xmb and xht, respectively. (Mergers occur at the time when a hostile
takeover becomes credible. Thus the threshold for a merger is xht.) Recall also that the
ﬁrst-best and the managers’ closure policies are given by the demand thresholds xo and x,
respectively.
Table 2 summarizes the main results: Raiders are ﬁrst-best. Hostile takeovers are
second-best: closure (and takeover) happen either at the eﬃcient time, or ineﬃciently early
if there is an incentive to preempt. Management buyouts come third: closure happens
ineﬃciently late, but still at a higher level of demand than the level that forces managers to
shut down. Closure is least eﬃcient in mergers, since the managers’ policies remain in place,
and the managers collect rents for as long as possible. Unlike the other takeover mechanisms
29Table 2: Takeover and closure thresholds: a comparison across takeover mechanisms
takeover threshold closure threshold
raider xr = xo ﬁrst-best (at xo)
hostile takeover xo ≤ xht ﬁrst-best (at xo) or too early (at xht)
management buyout x <x mb <x o ineﬃciently late (at xmb)
merger xo ≤ xht ineﬃciently late (at x)
the merger threshold and the closure threshold do not coincide. The merger happens at xht
(≥ xo) but closure only occurs at x (≤ xo). Mergers may therefore happen when demand
is still relatively high, yet closure occurs ineﬃciently late, when demand is lower and below
the ﬁrst-best demand threshold.
Several empirical or policy implications can be drawn from our analysis.
1. Raiders and hostile takeovers can improve eﬃciency by forcing closure of the target
ﬁrm at the correct level of demand. Acquiring managers and target shareholders are the main
beneﬁciaries. The total gains to target and acquiring shareholders overstate the value added
by hostile takeovers, however, because the target shareholders gain at the target managers’
expense.
2. Mergers are a management-friendly alternative to hostile takeovers. These mergers
redistribute rents between the acquiring and the target managements, but do not lead to more
eﬃcient closure. Mergers also have a hostile side, however, because the target management
only agrees to a merger when a hostile takeover by the other ﬁrm becomes credible.
3. Hostile takeovers are more likely to occur when few managerial rents remain to be
collected in the target and when the acquiring managers are capable of capturing a relatively
large fraction (γ) of the value created. Mergers are more likely to occur in situations where
there are still signiﬁcant rents to be collected and/or in situations where the acquiring ﬁrm
would have to pay too high a bid premium (γ is small). We expect target ﬁrms in hostile
takeovers to be closer to voluntary shutdown than target ﬁrms in mergers.
4. We expect mergers between ﬁrms that are equal or similar (particularly in terms of
how eﬃciently they are run). Hostile takeovers are more likely to involve ﬁrms that are
diﬀerent. When ﬁrms are similar, say identical, then preemptive motives become important
and can speed up the takeover. Managers will prefer merging to a hostile takeover when
30ample rents remain to be collected, and when demand is still relatively high.
5. MBOs should not occur in the presence of raiders, hostile takeovers or mergers, since
these takeover types are triggered at higher levels of demand.
6. Firms with signiﬁcant debt are less likely to be takeover targets.
7. Hostile takeovers may be ﬁnanced by debt to ensure that the acquiring management
does not merely replace the target management, but closes the target after the restructuring.
8. Hostile takeovers, especially by raiders, generate signiﬁcant positive returns for target
shareholders. MBOs generate smaller, but positive, returns to the target shareholders. Non-
synergistic mergers generate zero returns for the acquiring and target shareholders. A raider
or hostile acquirer (if present) could therefore “win” in a competition with a MBO or merger.
Our conclusions about the relative eﬃciency of the various takeover mechanisms should
be interpreted with at least two caveats. First, we deﬁned eﬃciency in terms of the total
value to both managers and outside shareholders. There may be other stakeholders, includ-
ing customers, suppliers or employees left out of the coalition of managers that makes the
decisions in our model. Second, we have passed by takeover tactics. Our model would not
justify coercive two-part tender oﬀers, for example.
We have not considered merger synergies, where ﬁrms A and B are worth more operating
together than apart, but our model does predict that combinations motivated by synergies
will be mergers rather than hostile takeovers. If combining ﬁrms A and B adds value, then
their managers will agree to a friendly combination. A hostile takeover would allow one
ﬁrm’s stockholders to capture the value of its managers’ rents.
4 Conclusions
This paper starts with the observation that disinvestment in declining industries is usually
accompanied by – and apparently forced by – takeovers. We decided to explore such takeovers
theoretically. To do so we made several modeling choices.
1. We assumed that the ﬁrm’s managers act as a coalition in their own self interest. They
maximize the present value of future managerial rents, that is, the value of their capture
of the ﬁrm’s future operating cash ﬂows. Their rents are constrained by outside investors’
31ability to take control of the ﬁrm and its assets if the investors do not receive an adequate
rate of return. We assume that their rate of return comes from payout of cash to investors.
Managers close the ﬁrm when the burden of paying out cash to investors overcomes their
reluctance to leave the ﬁrm and give up the chance of future managerial rents.
2. Investors can exercise their property rights only after absorbing a cost of collective
action. This cost creates a gap between the overall value of the ﬁrm and its value to investors.
The gap allows the managers to capture part of the ﬁrm’s operating cash ﬂows. That
capture is not necessarily ineﬃcient, because managers may contribute human capital that
is specialized to the ﬁrm. Managerial rents can provide a return on that capital. Nevertheless,
the managers’ reluctance to give up their rents leads them to shrink or shut down the ﬁrm
too late, at a demand threshold lower than the ﬁrst-best threshold. Closure at the ﬁrst-best
threshold maximizes the sum of the values of the managers’ and investors’ claims. Just
maximizing shareholder value is not eﬃcient when the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows and value are shared
between managers and investors.
3. We built a dynamic, inﬁnite-horizon model incorporating the option to abandon the
ﬁrm and release its assets to investors. The model is similar to real-options analyses of
abandonment, except that the managers decide when to exercise. The inﬁnite (or indeﬁ-
nite) horizon is necessary to support outside equity ﬁnancing.23 The demand for the ﬁrm’s
products is treated as a continuous stochastic state variable. The continuity of demand is
important, because it allows us to distinguish several cases in a common setting and it leads
to closed-form solutions. For example, we can compare managers’ demand thresholds for
closure to the thresholds for takeover and closure by raiders or by other ﬁrms in hostile
takeovers or mergers. We can easily see how these thresholds depend on investors’ costs
of collective action, the drift and variance of demand and the ﬁxed costs of continuing to
operate the ﬁrm. We could not have done all these analyses in a matchstick model with two
or three dates and two or three discrete demand levels.
Our model generates the predictions about takeovers that are summarized at the end of
the last section. The model also generates new predictions about payout policy, the role of
golden parachutes and the links between debt and disinvestment.
As far as we know, our characterization of optimal payout policy (optimal for the man-
agers) is a new theoretical result. The ﬁrm’s payout policy has two regimes. When times are
good and demand is high, managers pay out a constant fraction of operating cash ﬂow. The
23See Fluck (1998) and Myers (2000).
32payout fraction is decreasing in the outsiders’ cost of collective action. When times are bad
and demand is low, payout is cut to a constant level equal to αrK, the ﬁrm’s opportunity
cost of capital adjusted for the cost of collective action. Payout is constant until the ﬁrm is
either closed or recovers to the point where payout is again linked to operating cash ﬂow.
Since managers closes the ﬁrm too late – they allow demand to fall too far before giving
up – we analyzed alternatives to takeovers as mechanisms for improving eﬃciency. We show
that a contract that pays managers a fraction of the capital stock – a “golden parachute”
– can speed up closure and increase equity value. However, the optimal golden parachute
for investors is not generous enough to assure ﬁrst-best closure. Golden parachutes are most
eﬀective for ﬁrms with a high cost of collective action, a low ﬁxed cost of operation and
a highly valued stock of capital. Golden parachutes should be more prevalent in slowly
declining industries with low product demand volatility, and also when interest rates are
high.
Of course these results about golden parachutes assume that closure and release of capital
are contractible. In real life such contracts may not be possible. Actual golden parachutes
pay oﬀ when there is a change in control, as in a takeover, which evidently is contractible.
Our model has something to say about real-life golden parchutes, however. Suppose, for
example, that managers of ﬁrm B could set up an impregnable takeover defense, and that
only a golden parachute could make them accept a takeover and shut-down of their ﬁrm.
Would B’s shareholders agree to a golden parachute generous enough to allow the takeover
and shut-down at the ﬁrst-best demand level? Our proposition 3 says no.
We also brieﬂy explored the role of debt. Debt service reduces managerial rents and forces
managers to close the ﬁrm earlier. There exists an optimal debt level D∗ that maximizes
overall ﬁrm value by forcing managers to implement the ﬁrst-best closure policy. This debt
level D∗ is dynamically optimal, but independent of the level of demand. We argued that
debt ﬁnancing may play an important role in hostile takeovers. Since there is a danger
that the acquiring management may inherit the incentives of the target management, debt
ﬁnancing may ensure that managers close the target after the takeover, and that managers
not merely replace the target management. Further research intends to analyze debt policy
in more detail.
335 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1












o are constants that need to be determined by the boundary conditions, and
where λ and β are respectively the negative and positive root of the characteristic equation:
1
2
σ2p(p − 1) + µp = r (19)
As xt →∞the abandonment option becomes worthless and the ﬁrm value converges to the expected
present value of all future cashﬂows of the ﬁrm’s operations, given by:
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which implies that Bv
o = 0. The term Av
o xλ represents the value of the abandonment option and
is determined by the boundary condition at closure. The value-matching condition requires that








o xoλ = K (21)










o xoλ−1 = 0 (22)
Solving the above system of equations gives proposition 1. Since λ<0 it follows that the second
order condition for xo is always satisﬁed.
Proof of proposition 2
Managers maximize R(x) with respect to the payout policy p(x) and a closure policy x at which
they stop servicing the payout. Assume for now that at x managers act non-cooperatively and have
to be forced out, which means that outside investors have to take collective action and receive αK
at x. We return afterwards to the case of cooperation and its implications for the solution.
We ﬁrst prove that there exists a payout policy such that for any closure policy x (≤ xo) the
cost of collective action constraint is always binding, i.e. E(x)=αV o(x). This policy is given by:
p(x)=α(Kx − f)f o rx>x o
= αrK for x0 ≥ x ≥ x
34Indeed, deﬁne H(x) as the value of a claim on the above payout policy plus a payment αK at x.
Then H(x) must satisfy the following diﬀerential equations:
rH(x)=α(Kx − f)+µxH (x)+1
2σ2x2H  (x)f o rx>x o
rH(x)=rαK + µxH (x)+1
2σ2x2H  (x)f o r x ≤ xo
Let us deﬁne H(x) ≡ H(x) when x>x o and H(x) ≡ H(x) when x ≤ xo. Then the general








+ Ah xλ + Bh xβ
H(x)=αK + Ah xλ + Bh xβ
The constants Ah, Bh, Ah and Bh are the solutions to the following boundary conditions. First,







, which implies that Bh =0 .
Second, at x the insiders stop paying out dividends and have to be forced out. Outsiders receive
αK and hence H(x)=αK, or equivalently:
H(x)=αK + Ahxλ + Bhxβ = αK (23)
Third, in order to rule out arbitrage opportunities H(x) must be continuous and diﬀerentiable at
the payout switch xo,s oH(xo)=H(xo)a n dH (xo)=H
 (xo).24 Or equivalently,















Combining the above two equations allows us to substitute out Ah. Simplifying, and substituting
for xo gives:







(β − λ) Bhxoβ = 0 (25)
Consequently, Bh = 0; substituting into (23) gives Ah = 0, and hence H(x)=αK. Substituting
this into the value-matching condition at xo allows us to solve for Ah, and gives us H(x). Combining
our results for H(x)a n dH(x)g i v e s :H(x)=αV o(x), and hence the collective action constraint is
always binding, irrespective of the closure threshold x. Consequently, the payout policy is optimal
for the insiders, as any reduction in the payout would cause the constraint to be violated.
24Since the Brownian motion can diﬀuse freely across the dividend switch, xo, the functions H(x), E(x)
and R(x) cannot change abruptly across this point. Dixit (1993) shows that at reversible switching points
the functions must be continuous and diﬀerentiable. Continuity is ensured by a value-matching condition.
Diﬀerentiability is achieved by the smooth-pasting condition (see also Karatzas and Shreve (1991), Theorem
4.9 p271).
35Given the payout policy p(x) that is imposed on the insiders, we can now derive the outsiders’
claim value R(x) and their optimal closure policy. Under the payout policy p(x) the claim R(x)
must satisfy the following diﬀerential equations:
rR(x)=( 1 − α)(Kx − f)+µxR (x)+1
2σ2x2R  (x)f o r x>x o
rR(x)=( Kx − f) − rαK + µxR (x)+1
2σ2x2R  (x)f o rx ≤ xo
Let us deﬁne R(x) ≡ R(x) when x>x o and R(x) ≡ R(x) when x ≤ xo. Then the general
solution for R(x)a n dR(x)i sg i v e nb y :















− αK + Ar xλ + Br xβ
The constants Ar, Br, Ar, Br and the managerial abandonment threshold x are the solutions to








, which implies that Br = 0. Second, at x the insiders stop paying out dividends
and are forced out. This means that their claim value is zero at x, i.e. R(x) = 0. Third, in order
to rule out arbitrage opportunities inside equity value must be continuous and diﬀerentiable at the
payout switch xo,s oR(xo)=R(xo)a n dR (xo)=R
 (xo). Finally, since the management optimally
chooses the closure threshold, x, it satisﬁes the following smooth-pasting condition: R (x)=0 .
In summary, we have ﬁve equations (two value-matching and two smooth-pasting conditions,
and one no-bubble condition) and ﬁve unknowns (Ar, Br, Ar, Br and x). The solution method is
exactly as before. Combining the two boundary conditions at xo gives Br = 0. Substituting into











Substituting into the condition R(xo)=R(xo) allows us to solve for Ar. Finally, solving R (x)=0
for x gives the expression for x in proposition 2. The second order condition for a maximum is










which is always satisﬁed.
Finally, we solve for the outside equity value E(x). If insiders do not cooperate then the outside
equity value is given by E(x)=H(x)=αV o(x). However, by oﬀering insiders an inﬁnitesimal
bribe it should be possible to avoid the deadweight cost of collective action and we therefore consider
it to be the natural equilibrium. Cooperation would not alter the insiders’ closure or payout policy
as from assumption 2 it follows that the stock of capital is protected by property rights and that
promises to return this capital in the future cannot be used to obtain concessions on payout.25
25In section 2.4 we consider the case where the bribe is not arbitrarily small, but takes the form of a golden
parachute. In this case the management’s closure policy is aﬀected.
36However, it would mean that at x outsiders receive K instead of αK. Going through the same
derivation as for H(x), but replacing the condition E(x)=αK by E(x)=K,g i v e s :






E(x)=K for x ≤ x
Substituting our expressions for V (x), R(x)a n dE(x) one can easily verify that V (x)=R(x)+
E(x), i.e. in the absence of any dead weight cost or other frictions the managers’ and shareholders’
claim values sum up to the total ﬁrm value.
Proof of proposition 3
The derivation of the claim values for the shareholders and managers is exactly the same as
in the proof of proposition 2, except that the boundary conditions R(x)=0a n dE(x)=K are











The second order condition is the same as before and always satisﬁed.




 λ −λK(r − µ)
x(1 − λ)
 





Solving for θ, and taking into account that θ ≤ 1 gives the expression for θ∗ given in the proposition.




 λ −λK(r − µ)
x(1 − λ)
(λ − 1) < 0 (30)
Substituting θ∗ into the expression for x gives the solution for x under the optimal golden parachute.
Proof of proposition 4
The raider’s payoﬀfrom restructuring is given by S(x) ≡ γ (K − V (x;x)). We ﬁrst prove that
the raider’s optimal takeover strategy is a trigger strategy. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Huang
and Li (1990) show that when the underlying state variable follows a geometric Brownian motion
then a trigger strategy is adopted if the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ from investing (‘stopping’)
right away and the value of waiting for one more instant is monotonic in the state variable. If S(x)
denotes the payoﬀfrom investing at x then in our model the condition for a trigger strategy to be
adopted requires that (see Dixit and Pindyck (2nd print) p130):
D(x) ≡ rS(x) − µxS (x) − 0.5σ2x2S  (x) (31)
37be monotonic in x. Substituting S(x)i n t oD(x), and simplifying gives:
D(x)=−γ (Kx− f)+γrK (32)
Since D(x) is monotonically decreasing in x it follows that the raider acquires the target as soon
as x falls below some threshold xr.
The raider’s option to acquire has the following general solution OSr(x)=B1 xλ + B2xβ.
The condition limx→+∞ OSr(x) = 0 implies that B2 = 0. The constant B1 is determined by the




























− γA (x)xλ (34)
Optimizing with respect to xr we ﬁnd that xr = xo where xo is the ﬁrst best closure threshold as
deﬁned in proposition 1. The second order condition is always satisﬁed.
Proof of proposition 5
The proof of the takeover threshold is the same as for proposition 4. The derivation why debt
ﬁnancing may be required is given in the text prior to the proposition.
Proof of proposition 6 (proof in text)
Proof of proposition 7
The derivation of the management buyout option OMB(x;xmb) is analogous to the raider case,
but with the management’s payoﬀgiven by S(x) ≡ γ (K − V (x;x)) − R(x;x).
We ﬁrst prove that also for a MBO a trigger strategy is optimal. The condition for a trigger
strategy to be adopted requires that:
D(x) ≡ rS(x) − µxS (x) − 0.5σ2x2S  (x) (35)
be monotonic in x. Substituting S(x)i n t oD(x), and simplifying gives:
D(x)=( f − Kx )(1+γ − α)+γrK for x>x o
=( f − Kx )(1+γ)+( γ + α)rK for x ≤ xo (36)
Since D(x) is always monotonically decreasing in x it follows that the MBO happens as soon as x
falls below some threshold xmb.





























The optimal management buyout threshold xmb is the solution to the ﬁrst order condition xmbS (xmb) −
λS(xmb) = 0. To verify the second order condition we diﬀerentiate OMB(x;xmb) twice with re-
spect to xmb. We substitute R(x)b y( V (x) − E(x)) and use the solutions for V (x)a n dE(x)a s
given in proposition 2. Simplifying gives:
∂2OMB(x;xmb)
∂xmb
2 < 0 ⇐⇒ −(1−λ)(1+γ)
K
r − µ
+ α(1−λ)V o 
(xmb)+αxmbV o  
(xmb) < 0 (38)
For xmb <x o the second order condition reduces to −(1 − λ)(1 + γ) K
r−µ < 0, which is always
satisﬁed. For xmb ≥ xo the second order condition simpliﬁes to −(1 − λ)(1 + γ − α) K
r−µ < 0,
which is also always satisﬁed.
Finally, we prove that xmb <x o. Diﬀerentiating OMB(x;xmb) with respect to xmb and






































       




The inequality follows from the fact that the ﬁrst term is zero and the second and third term are
negative. Consequently, xo cannot be a maximum. The presence of the second and third term
diﬀerentiate the MBO from the raider case. Since both those terms are negative for all values of
xmb, it follows that the optimal trigger value for xmb is situated to the left of xo (i.e. xmb <x o).
Proof of proposition 8
Deﬁne S(x) ≡ γ (K − V (x;x)) − R(x;x)=γK − (1 + γ)V (x;x)+E(x;x)f o rx ≥ x.W e
want to prove that there exists a x∗∗(>x ) such that S(x) > (<)0 ⇐⇒ x<(>)x∗∗.
It follows immediately that S(x)=0a n dS(+∞)=−∞. Substituting ﬁrst R(x)b yV (x) −
E(x), and substituting next for the managerial closure threshold x it follows that:
S (x) > 0 ⇐⇒ −(1 + γ)
K
r − µ















⇐⇒ −λKγ(1 − α) > 0 (40)
39Furthermore, S(x) is strictly concave over [x,x o] since:
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Deﬁne Sr(x) ≡ γ (K − V (x;x)), then we know from the analysis of the raider case that xo Sr
 (xo)=
λSr(xo) < 0, and hence the function Sr(x) reaches its maximum at some xmax <x o. Since R(x)
is positive and monotonically increasing, it follows that S(x) reaches its maximum even earlier.
It follows from the above that S(x) is a (concave) inverted U-shaped function over [x,x o] (with
S(x) = 0).
Consider next the behavior of S(x)f o rx ≥ xo.S i n c e b o t h γ(K − V (x)) and (−R(x)) are
decreasing functions, it follows that their sum is also decreasing, and hence S(x) is monotonically
decreasing over x ≥ xo. Combining the results for x<x o and x ≥ xo, it follows from the continuity
of S(x) that there exists a x∗∗ such that S(x) > (<)0 ⇐⇒ x<(>)x∗∗.
The remainder of the proof is described in the main text preceding proposition 8.
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